This Article takes the bursting of the dot com bubble as an opportunity to reevaluate the tax structure of venture capital startups. By organizing startups as corporations rather than as partnerships, investors and entrepreneurs seem to leave money on the table by failing to fully use tax losses -e specially since the vast majority of startups fail. Conventional wisdom attributes the lack of attention paid to losses to a "gambler's mentality" or optimism bias. I argue here that the use of the corporate form is, in fact, rational, or at least that there is a method to the madness.
Like blackjack players on their way to Las Vegas, they refuse to even think about losses, and they are hardly willing to plan the adventure with losses in mind. 13 This Article argues that even in the post-bubble era the exuberance of venture capital deal planners is rational, or, at least, that there is a method to the madness. There is surely some truth in the observation that startups are organized in a tax-inefficient manner: partnerships are, on paper, more tax-efficient than corporations.
14 But various "frictions" -non-tax business costs such as transaction costs, information problems, reputational concerns, and adverse accounting treatment -currently prevent deal planners from using the theoretically tax-favorable form. 15 If these frictions wear down over time,
we may well see more startups organized as partnerships. But for now I think it is a mistake to conclude that startups are organized irrationally, or to accept the conventional wisdom that a casino mentality or some other cognitive bias explains the behavior of deal planners.
I make four main points. First, the tax losses are not as valuable as they might seem; tax rules prohibit many investors from capturing the full benefit of the losses.
Second, the VC professionals who structure the deals do not personally share in the losses, so they have little reason to care about the tax effects of the losses. Third, gains are taxed more favorably if the startup is organized as a corporation from the outset, and again, this favorable treatment of gains is especially attractive to the VC professionals - 13 See SWINGERS (screenplay by Jon Favreau, 1997) (Mike: "Do you think we'll get there by midnight?" Trent: "Baby, we'll be up five hunny [hundred] by midnight.") 14 There is a rich literature discussing the "corporate integration" question, with most commentators concluding that it would be wise to tax corporations and partnerships in a similar manner. 1312, 1315-17 (2001) (explaining concept of using frictions such as high transaction costs, adverse financial accounting, or unappealing regulatory treatment to constrain abusive tax planning).
further evidence that agency costs may be playing a role here. Fourth, corporations are less complex than partnerships: organizing as a corporation minimizes legal costs and simplifies employee compensation and exit strategy.
This Article makes two contributions to the existing academic literature. 16 First, I
present a solution to the puzzle of why startups are structured as corporations, showing how agency costs, transaction costs, and the practical application of some key tax rules impact the structuring decision in ways not considered by prior commentators. Second, this Article calls attention to the value of seeking out rational explanations before accepting irrational ones -especially when analyzing the behavior of sophisticated experts. In recent years, the legal academy has increasingly focused on cognitive biases and has drawn on the growing scholarship in the field of behavioral economics.
17
Although Professor Bankman's article predates the recent cascade of behavioral law and economics papers, a significant portion of his explanation of venture capital organization correlates with the "optimism bias" concept found in the behavioral literature -the phenomenon that people tend to overestimate their abilities and likelihood of success.
18 16 The existing literature on this topic is quite thin. Other than Professor Bankman's article, most tax articles discussing the structuring of startups are written by practitioners, focus on narrow issues, and tend to accept the use of the corporate form for startups as a given. See Thomas A. 639-640 (2001) While the psychological phenomenon of optimism bias may be part of the story here, this
Article shows that there is much more to it. Sophisticated actors who are unaffected by optimism bias -or whose optimism was crushed by the recent bear market -would rationally make the same organizational choice as the stereotypical Silicon Valley VC afflicted with rose-tinted vision. The broader point is that cognitive biases, though sometimes enlightening, should be used as a last resort rather than as a primary or allpurpose explanation for seemingly irrational behavior. If identifying these biases keep us from rigorously testing rational explanations, we may sometimes miss the subtle yet important details that can help account for the behavior of sophisticated actors in a complex marketplace.
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This Article is divided into five short parts. Part I explores the tax benefits of the partnership structure. Part II describes various limits on taxpayers' ability to use those tax benefits. Part III considers agency costs and the advantages the corporate structure provides to entrepreneurs and VCs, especially with respect to the tax treatment of gains.
Part IV compares the simplicity of the corporate structure with the relative complexity of the partnership structure. Part V concludes.
(discussing role of optimism bias in regulating doctor-patient relationship). A Westlaw search of law review articles reveals 71 separate articles referring to "optimistic bias" or "optimism bias," most of which appear in the last 3 years, and 65 of which postdate Professor Bankman's 1994 article (search conducted August 30, 2002 in Westlaw's JLR database).
I. THE PUZZLE
Entrepreneurs are optimists. 20 They believe that their ideas, like the children of Lake Wobegon, are all better than average. 21 This cognitive bias leads to a heightened sense of confidence and control, blunting the perception of risk and masking the likelihood of failure. 22 In a recent study, more than one-third of Silicon Valley engineers rated their performance among the top 5% of all engineers, and nearly 90% placed their performance in the top 25%. 23 Given this cognitive bias, the gambler's mentality of Silicon Valley would appear to be a plausible explanation for why startups are organized as corporations. A behavioral law and economics approach would suggest that entrepreneurs and VCs are foolishly optimistic and should pay more attention to losses.
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As sober-minded and dispassionate lawyers, should we throw a wet blanket over this irrational exuberance? 21 Garrison Keillor famously ends his public radio show, A Prairie Home Companion, by saying goodbye from Lake Wobegon, where "the women are strong, the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average. Rev. (1995) . 25 For an example of the wet blanket approach, see Goldberg, supra note 12 (debunking the "myths" that lead to choosing the C Corp Structure). 28 Professor Bankman did explore other possible explanations in his article, noting that he found it troubling to discover that sophisticated investors were consistently choosing a bad deal structure, and it would be unfair to characterize his Article as a simple adoption of the gambler's mentality view. But I think it is fair to say that Bankman tended to focus on irrational explanations rather than rational ones, and that most of his Article tends to come back, one way or another, to cognitive bias. See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1747 (noting surprise at overall lack of tax awareness among executives and venture capitalists).
Perhaps more importantly, subsequent commentators have fully embraced the irrational exuberance explanation. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 943 ("… stock options may be a means of attracting young high-tech but financially unsophisticated employees, ready to overvalue the options as compensation and therefore accept less cash compensation than the actual value of the options would warrant. Perhaps this represents a real value of incorporating in the era of irrational exuberance.") 29 Most corporations are "C Corporations" because they are taxed under subchapter C of the tax Code, as distinguished from "S Corporations," which are taxed under subchapter S. Certain closely-held corporations may elect subshapter S treatment. Unless otherwise noted, references in this Article to corporate tax treatment refer to C Corporations, not S Corporations. S Corporations are not generally suitable for venture capital startups because of the restrictions on the types of shareholders permitted and LLC 30 (the Passthrough Structure). Assume for now that each company is engaged in the same business, with the same caliber of talent and the same likelihood of success in the marketplace.
THE C CORP STRUCTURE
GainCorp is organized as a Delaware corporation with two classes of stock: common stock and convertible participating preferred stock. The founders and managers hold the common stock and options to buy common stock. The VC Fund receives preferred stock, which may be converted into common stock in the event of a qualified IPO.
Entrepreneurs / Management
Business Assets
THE PASSTHROUGH STRUCTURE
LossLLC is organized as a Delaware limited liability company. The VC Fund receives 100% of the capital interests in the LLC. The founders and managers receive profits interests and partnership options.
VC professionals LP Investors

Entrepreneurs / Management
The economic deal struck among the parties is the same in both structures. 31 The VC Fund, which itself is a partnership funded by limited partners (LP Investors, or LPs), on the way the economics of the deal can be allocated. See § 1361(b)(1)(B) (only individuals and certain estates and trusts permitted as S Corp shareholders); § 1361(b)(1)(D) (only one class of stock permitted). 30 The reader should note that although LLCs and limited partnerships differ in terms of governance and corporate law, each is normally treated as a partnership for tax purposes (i.e., as a passthrough entity), and when I refer to partnership tax treatment, the reference should be read to include the tax treatment of LLCs as well as partnerships. 31 The deal structures of venture capital investments tend to look very much alike. Although the economics of the investment vary greatly from deal to deal -valuations vary; sometimes VCs take a large stake in the VC Fund, LP GainCorp, Inc. 891, 897-901 (2002) (describing preferred stock arrangements regarding control). On the upside, the VC Fund has the right to the first profits of the company and a share of profits beyond that -represented by liquidation preference and conversion rights written in to the terms of the preferred stock in the case of GainCorp, and liquidation and preference rights written in to the operating agreement in the case of LossLLC.
33 See § 195 . In general, a capital expenditures is the cost of acquiring property that has a useful life extending beyond the close of the taxable year. The cost is included in or added to the basis of the acquired property and either recovered over time through depreciation or amortization deductions or recovered when the property is sold. See generally Marvin A. Chirelstein, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 107 (7 th ed. 1994).
34 See § 174. broadly to include the costs of salary, rent, and equipment associated with research.
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There is also a tax credit for research costs under § 41, which gives qualifying taxpayers a credit for 20% of their incremental increase in research expenses from prior years above a statutorily-calculated, taxpayer-specific, base amount. 36 As a result of these Code sections, a startup will generate tax losses within five years that, when added together, nearly equal the amount of money originally contributed to the venture.
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The Passthrough Structure enables taxable LPs to take advantage of these tax losses. The operating agreement of LossLLC allocates tax losses to the VC Fund, a limited partnership which is also a passthrough entity for tax purposes. 38 The VC Fund's partnership agreement then allocates tax losses to LPs in proportion to the amount of money each contributed at the start of the Fund. The LPs realize the tax losses generated by LossLLC in the same year they were incurred and, subject to various restrictions discussed below, use those losses to offset other taxable income.
The C Corp Structure, on the other hand, cannot take full advantage of tax losses generated by the startup. As a corporation, GainCorp traps its tax losses at the entity level and carries them forward as a net operating loss (NOL • the Strikeout, in which the VC Fund puts in $3 million in year one and the startup is sold in year six for $500,000, generating a net pre-tax loss of $2.5 million;
• the Base Hit, in which the VC Fund puts in $3 million in year one and $3 million in year four, and the startup is sold in year six for $14 million, with $12 million of the proceeds going to the fund, generating a net pre-tax gain of $6 million for the Fund, and
• the Home Run, in which the VC Fund puts in $3 million in years one, four, and five, and the startup IPOs in year six with a market capitalization of $300 million, and the Fund sells its stake for $75 million, generating a net pre-tax gain of $66 million for the Fund.
41
I have (for the moment) adopted a series of common assumptions, each of which favors Rev. 709 (1981) . 41 The baseball metaphor is an unfortunate cliché, but I employ it here because it is the metaphor commonly used in the venture capital industry. A single is often used to denote a 100% return on investment, a double for a 2x return, and a home run or grand slam for greater returns. See also Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1764-65 ("'The industry has a home run mentality,' stated a prominent venture capitalist in response to a similar inquiry into the lack of attention to tax benefits.' Others interviewed expressed like sentiments, often relying on the same baseball metaphor.").
reduced by 20% to account for the "carried interest" allocated to the VC professionals who manage the Fund. Base Hit. Using the same LossLLC-favorable assumptions, LossLLC is also superior to GainCorp in the Base Hit scenario. 44 The net present value of the taxable 42 The term "carry" or "carried interest" derives from the fact that the VCs' upside is generated from capital contributed by others; if the Fund performs well, the LPs "carry" the VCs along for the ride. 43 For tax-exempt investors, the return is the same either way.
42
The assumptions for the Strikeout scenario are as follows. In year one, a $3 million investment is made, and in year six, the investment is sold for $500,000. I assume a pre-tax loss of $1.8 million in year one, followed by $300,000 in years two, three, four, and five. In LossLLC, the investment now has a basis of zero, and in year six is sold at a gain of $500,000; I assume a 20% capital gains rate. 44 The assumptions for the Base Hit scenario are as follows. In year one, a $3 million investment is made. In year 4, another $3 million is invested. In year six, the investment is sold for $12 million. I assume a pre-tax loss of $1.8 million in year one, $300,000 in years two and three, $3,300,000 in year four (i.e. that the new investment money is immediately used), and $300,000 in year five. Once again, all the basis is LPs' investment in LossLLC is $2.91 million, versus $1.73 million in GainCorp. As in the Strikeout scenario, the present value of the tax losses significantly improves the aftertax return for taxable LPs. used up in LossLLC, and the gain in year six is taxed at a 20% capital gain rate. One further complication: the pre-tax gain is also a "pre-carry" gain; it is reduced by 20% to reflect the carried interest of the VCs, then reduced by the 20% capital gains rate to reach the final after-tax return. 45 The assumptions for the Home Run scenario are as follows. In years one, four, and five, the Fund invests $3 million. In year six, the investment is sold for $75 million. The sales price for GainCorp is slightly higher, reflect the value of the $9 million NOL. Again, the "pre-tax" figure is also "pre-carry"; the aftertax return reflects the reduction for the carried interest of the VCs. 46 In one sample, which included later stage financings as well as the early stage financings that I am focused on here, 50 percent of the total return was generated by only 6. The tables above rely on several key assumptions, including full use of tax losses by LPs, a 20% capital gains tax rate, and zero transaction costs. Given these passthrough-favorable assumptions, the LossLLC structure generates a superior after-tax return, as expected ($3.05 million vs. $2.20 million). Calculated in terms of internal rate of return, the investment in LossLLC generates an expected IRR of 26%, vs. 18% for GainCorp. If this were the whole story, we would expect startups to opt for the Passthrough Structure in order to lower the startup's financing costs. But further analysis
shows that these assumptions are unrealistic. With more realistic assumptions, the balance ultimately tilts in favor of the C Corp Structure.
II. WHY PARTNERSHIP TAX LOSSES ARE LESS ATTRACTIVE THAN THEY SEEM
When a startup organized as a partnership generates tax losses, the value of those losses depends on whether the LP investors have taxable income to offset and whether the tax Code allows the LPs to use the losses immediately. Of the four major classes of venture capital investors -U.S. individuals, U.S. corporations, tax-exempt investors, and foreign investors -only a subset of one class, widely-held U.S. corporations with current tax liability, can use the losses fully and is likely to prefer the Passthrough Structure. For other investors, the Passthrough Structure is actually disadvantageous, as it either creates new tax liabilities or eliminates tax benefits available in the C Corp Structure. Moreover, the VC professionals who structure the deals so not share in the losses, so they have little reason to pay attention to the tax effects of losses.
in 2001, the 3 year average IRR is 49.3%, the 5 year average IRR is 36%, the 10 year average IRR is 27%, and the 20 year average IRR is 18%. See id. at 14.
A. The VC Professionals: Indifferent to Losses
The key potential advantage of the Passthrough Structure is the impact of tax losses on the LP investors. But it may be more important to consider first the impact of losses on the venture capital professionals (VCs) who manage the funds. VCs hold a substantial economic stake in the funds they manage, but only on the upside. In a typical partnership agreement with LP investors, the VCs contribute just one percent of the capital to the fund but receive a carried interest of 20%: that is, they receive 20% of the profits of the entire fund despite only putting up a small amount of money. 48 The carry
gives the VCs a large share of the upside potential but almost none of the downside. The tax losses generated by the Passthrough Structure therefore have almost no value to the VCs.
49
The VCs' attitude toward tax losses is significant. The VCs dictate the deal structure at the point of initial investment, even though the startup's founders technically control the startup. VCs are usually much more experienced and sophisticated in structuring investments than the founders, and they tend to be the dominant force in negotiations, especially in legal matters. As a result, agency costs -the tendency for agents investing other people's money to do so in a way that enhances their own personal benefit -partly explains why the Passthrough Structure is unpopular. 50 The advantages of the Passthrough Structure inure almost entirely to the benefit of LPs; the VCs, acting 48 To be precise, the VCs receive 20.8% of the profits; the extra 0.8% is generated by the 1% of capital contributed by the VCs multiplied by the 80% of profits not already allocated to the VCs. 49 The arrangement is roughly economically equivalent to giving the VCs an option to buy 20% of the fund at a strike price of zero. Like any option, this incentivizes the VCs to make riskier investments than they would if they owned a substantial stake in the fund outright and also therefore shared in the losses. On the impact of options on the behavior of managers, see, e.g., Calvin H. 53 See Gompers & Lerner, Venture Capital Cycle, supra note 32, ch. 4 (analyzing LP agreements and concluding that while carried interest percentages are held constant, management fees vary depending on the ability and experience of the VCs). 54 An additional agency costs factor may have helped cement the status quo, especially in the late 1990s: law firms that wish to make equity investments in their clients may prefer the C Corp Structure, as becoming a "partner" in the client's business venture may create a greater appearance of impropriety than merely holding common stock or options in a corporate client. The relevant conflict of interest rules, however, do not rely on a per se approach or draw distinctions based on formalities, but rather look to the degree to which the law firms' independence might be compromised. potential market for these tax losses is quite small: tax rules make losses attractive to only a small subset of potential LP investors.
B. Individual Investors: Passive Loss Constraints
Individuals make up a relatively small portion of the venture capital investor pool. 55 The securities laws exclude many potential investors by limiting the eligibility of individuals to "accredited investors" who have annual income in excess of $200,000 or net worth in excess of $1,000,000. 56 The securities laws are not the only limiting factor, however: special tax rules enacted in 1986 discourage venture capital investment by individuals, including high net worth individuals exempt from securities laws restrictions.
In 1986 Congress enacted the passive loss rules of § 469 as part of an effort to shut down abusive tax shelters. 57 An unintended consequence of this legislation was to make passive investing in partnerships a tax-disfavored activity, even for "real" deals not generally considered abusive. 58 In the absence of § 469, individuals would be permitted to take passive losses to offset ordinary income. Section 469 disallows current 61 See Bankman, Passive Loss Rules, supra note 54, at 24 (noting that the restrictions "comprise one of the more complicated areas of the tax law").
however, the passive loss rules prevent limited partners in VC funds from immediately using the losses, as LPs do not normally help manage the portfolio companies in any significant way. 62 The tax losses in the Passthrough Structure flow through to the VC Fund and then to the LPs, but individuals may not use those losses immediately to offset taxable income from non-passive activities. The passive losses are instead "suspended"
or carried forward and may be used only to offset passive income, or may be added to basis when the LP's interest in the passive activity is sold. 63 The present value of the tax loss is thereby significantly diminished. 64 For individual investors, the passive loss rules suffocate the very purpose of the Passthrough Structure by eliminating the benefit of the flowthrough of tax losses.
62 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive Loss Rules, BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio 549-2 nd at 21 (2000) (discussing material participation standard). The VCs, unlike the LPs, would have a very strong argument that their oversight of portfolio companies constitutes material participation. But under the terms of the economic deal, VCs are usually allocated 20% of the gains and just 1% of the losses, so the tax losses matter little to the VCs. Similarly, the entrepreneurs who manage the portfolio company would not be constrained by the passive loss rules, but would also likely have an economic arrangement which effectively allocates to the only gains and not losses.
Angel investors are often U.S. high-net-worth individuals, and the companies that they invest in are sometimes structured as partnerships. Although the involvement of angel investors varies widely, many avoid the passive loss rules because they often sit on the boards of directors of the companies they invest in and provide advice to the founders and management, creating a good argument for "material participation," depending on the facts and circumstances. The availability of the losses to angel investors helps explain why at the pre VC stage, many companies are structured as partnerships, while at the VC stage, they convert to corporations. 63 See § § 469(d)(1), 469(g). Some wealthy individuals with passive losses do have (or seek out) investments that create passive income. Such passive income generators, appropriately called PIGs, would benefit from the passthrough structure. For many taxpayers, however, it is difficult to convert nonpassive income -e.g., salary -income passive income. See Daniel Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1189 Rev. , 1256 Rev. (1989 ("For many taxpayers, such as professionals and salaried employees, it is not feasible to convert significant amounts of compensation income into passive income. … Some taxpayers, however, such as entrepreneurs who own and operate a variety of businesses, may have considerably less difficulty creating passive income and nonpassive losses; but the passive loss rules probably reduce substantially the pool of investment dollars that are available for investments designed to produce tax losses.") 64 Eliminating the time value of the tax losses is enough to discourage classic "tax shelter" activity in which individuals are willing to incur long-term economic losses to achieve short-term tax benefits.
C. Foreign Investors: ECI Concerns
As a practical matter, foreign investors cannot benefit from the tax losses in the Passthrough Structure. Foreign individuals are subject to the passive loss rules, so that just as with U.S. individuals, the flowthrough of tax losses has no significant benefit. For foreign corporations that invest in VC funds, two primary concerns make the Passthrough Structure unattractive: (1) the concept of effectively connected income, or "ECI", and (2) the branch profits tax of § 884.
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A complex set of rules governs the taxation of foreign corporations that invest in U.S. companies. Foreign corporations that sell stock in a U.S. corporation are generally exempt from U.S. capital gains tax on any appreciation in that stock.
66 So long as a foreign corporation is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business by operating a U.S. must pay U.S. tax on the "effectively connected income," or ECI, generated by that portion of the business. Recognizing ECI is problematic because many foreign investors want to avoid the U.S. tax system altogether, including the obligation to file a U.S. tax return. 70 The concern is serious enough that many fund agreements require the VCs to promise to avoid generating ECI.
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The branch profits tax is an additional concern for foreign corporations.
Assuming that the startup generates tax losses in the early years of the venture, the possibility of ECI would appear to be a red herring, since tax is due only to the extent that there is taxable income, not loss. But § 884, which imposes a branch profits tax on U.S. The basic policy principle that seems to be at stake here is whether business profits generated in the U.S. must be subject to at least one level of tax. 74 Foreign investors are usually taxed in the U.S. only on income that is ECI or certain types of fixed passive income (FDAP income) subject to withholding, and real estate investments.
Careful tax planning can enable foreign corporations to invest in U.S. venture capital funds that invest in portfolio companies structured as partnerships. A "blocker" entity can be inserted into the structure to block the passthrough effects of the partnership form; the passthrough of income and loss extends up the organizational chain only until there is a non-transparent taxpayer. If a blocker entity intervenes, the blocker entity traps income or loss at that level, the foreign LP's income from the startup is not "effectively connected," and the branch profits tax does not apply. Because the blocker entity traps not just gains but losses as well, however, the tax losses are not passed through to the investor for its immediate benefit. 75 Thus, the necessary blocker entity structure eliminates the benefit of the tax losses that would have motivated the use of the Passthrough Structure in the first place. For the sake of simplicity in deal planning, the C Corp Structure is preferred.
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D. Tax-Exempt Investors: UBTI Concerns
Tax-exempt entities such as pension funds and university endowments comprise the largest investor class in the venture capital industry. 77 Such entities do not have to pay tax on investment income. They do, however, have to pay tax on unrelated business taxable income, also known as "UBTI". 78 Because deemed ownership of an operating business generates unwanted UBTI, tax-exempt investors want to avoid being treated as if they own a portion of the startup's business.
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Tax-exempt entities prefer to receive returns on their investments in the form of returns not taxable to them (i.e., most investment interest, dividends, and capital gains), and they scrupulously avoid deal structures that pass through a pro rata portion of the ordinary income from a business, which is taxable as UBTI. Finally, to make a rather obvious point, tax-exempt investors do not care about tax losses, since they do not have tax liability which could be offset by such losses, except in the unusual case in which they have UBTI from other investments. The sole concern for most tax-exempt investors is the pre-tax return on the investment. To the extent that tax-exempt investors think about tax consequences at all, it is to ensure that they do not recognize any UBTI.
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E. Corporate Taxable Investors
There is one key class of investors not subject to any significant tax law restrictions: Corporate LPs. The tax losses generated by the Passthrough Structure are potentially valuable to Corporate LPs; widely-held corporations are not subject to the passive loss rules of § 469, and many corporations have current tax liability that they would like to shelter. 83 Some corporations do invest in startups, and one would expect 80 It is worth noting that absent the fear of audit, the partnership structure would make sense for some foreign and tax-exempt investors, as the early losses of startups could be used to offset other ECI/UBTI gains subject to U.S. tax on a net basis. See Needham, supra note 32, at 1231 n.96. 81 As with foreign investors, a "blocker" structure can be used to try to eliminate UBTI, eliminating both the disadvantage and advantage of the Passthrough Structure. 82 In Silicon Valley Startups, Professor Bankman noted the effect of the Passthrough Structure on taxexempt investors but argued that if the Passthrough Structure were adopted, corporate taxable investors might fill in the gap. I discuss this argument in the next section, infra text accompanying notes 78-86. 83 See § § 469 (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C) (applying passive loss rules only to closely-held C corporations and to personal service corporations).
such investors to push for the investment to be structured in the most tax-efficient form. In sum, key tax and nontax factors make the tax losses -the central advantage of the Passthrough Structure -worth less than they appear. The lack of attention paid to tax losses is not irrational or based on myth, but rather makes sense in the context of the current tax rules, accounting rules, and institutional investment market. 
III. GAINS ARE TAXED MORE FAVORABLY UNDER THE C CORP STRUCTURE
A. The Qualified Small Business Stock Subsidy
Section 1202 provides a partial exclusion of capital gains for investors in certain small businesses. 96 The section only applies if the business is organized as a C Corporation, not a partnership or other passthrough entity. Normally, if an individual investor sells stock in a corporation at a gain, and the stock has been held for more than a year, then the gain on the sale is treated as capital gain and taxed at 20% rate. 97 Under § 1202, which governs the sale of "qualified small business stock," 50% of the gains are excluded from the base rate of 28%, effectively creating a 14% capital gains rate.
98
A taxpayer must clear several hurdles to qualify for the § 1202 exclusion: among other things, the stock of the qualified small business (QSB) must be held for more than five years, the stock must be acquired from the QSB at original issue, and the gross assets of the QSB must not exceed $50 million at the time of issuance. 99 The exclusion is not available for corporate investors. 100 The exclusion is, however, important to other taxable investors (i.e. VCs and entrepreneurs), as many portfolio companies financed by VC funds do qualify as QSBs.
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Section 1045, which is an extension of § 1202, takes the benefits of QSB status even farther. Under § 1045, taxpayers may roll over the gain otherwise recognized on the sale of QSB stock to the extent the gain is reinvested in a new QSB within six months.
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The rollover provision has the effect of pushing down the effective tax rate below 14%, 96 See § 1202.
97 See § § 1221(a) (defining "capital asset"), 1222(3) (defining long-term capital gain), 1(h)(1) (describing rate structure. Before 2003, the usual capital gains rate was 20% for most long-term holdings, or 18% for certain property held for five or more years. As discussed below, in 2003, the usual capital gains rate dropped to 15%, making the § 1202 rules less significant. 100 See § 1202(a)(1) (making 1202 exclusion available "[i]n the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, ..."). 101 The application of the § 1202 exclusion to limited partners in a venture fund is somewhat complicated, as it is normally the fund and not the limited partner that sells the stock of the QSB. But the tax Code allows the tax break to work to the advantage of the limited partner. The partnership tax rules take an aggregate approach rather than an entity approach, allowing each individual partner of the VC fund to recognize his or her pro rata portion of the capital gain and then apply the 50% exclusion. See § 1202(g). Suppose a taxpayer pays $1 million for stock of a startup that is a QSB. The taxpayer holds the stock for five years, sells it for $3 million and then buys stock of a new qualified startup for $1 million. Absent § § 1045 and 1202, the taxpayer would face a capital gains tax of 20% times the $2 million gain, or $400,000. 103 With § § 1045 and 1202, the current tax due is $140,000, since $1 million of gain is rolled over under § 1045, and the remaining $1 million of gain is taxed at the reduced §1202 rate.
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Although some of the rollover amount will be recaptured later, when the stock in the new company with a carryover basis is sold, the end result is an effective tax rate somewhere between 7% and 14%. This rate is significantly lower than the 20% rate before 2003, and, in many circumstances, significantly lower than the 15% rate that currently applies.
103 See § § 1, 1221. 104 The gain rolled over under § 1045 is deferred, not excluded, as basis in the replacement QSB stock would be zero. See § 1045(b)(3).
The careful reader will note that the Code does not make it clear if both sections may be used together, and if so, in which order sections 1202 and 1045 apply. In accordance with what appears to be common practice, I apply 1045 first, then 1202, resulting in the lowest possible immediate tax due. Alternatively, one could apply section 1202 alone, resulting in an immediate tax due of $280,000, section 1045 alone, resulting in an immediate tax due of $200,000, or 1202 first, resulting in a tax due of $280,000 and a $1,000,000 reduction in the basis of the replacement stock purchased. See Cheryl T. Metrejean et al., Gains on Sales of Qualified Small Business Stock (manuscript on file with author).
SECTION 1202/1045 EXAMPLE Amount Realized
Less 1045 Rollover Amount = Adjusted Amount Realized Less Basis = Taxable Gain * 14% (1202 tax rate) = Tax Due 3,000,000 (1,000,000) 2,000,000 (1,000,000) 1,000,000 .14 140,000
The QSBS subsidy is significant to VCs and entrepreneurs. VCs often require portfolio companies to qualify: QSB status is part of the standard set of representations and warranties found in VC Fund-portfolio company contracts.
105 While the prevalence of this standard requirement does not prove that the § § 1202/1045 tax break drives the structuring decision, it at least shows that the deal planners (or their lawyers) are aware of the tax incentive.
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B. Agency Costs, Continued: Impact of 1202/1045 and NOLs on VC Professionals
Just as with losses, agency costs help explain the preference for the C Corp Structure regarding gains. The QSBS subsidy does not improve the after-tax returns for most LP investors, since corporate taxable investors are not allowed to take advantage of the subsidy, and tax-exempts and foreign investors do not pay any capital gains tax to begin with. However, the venture capital professionals who manage funds and drive structuring decisions do benefit significantly from the QSBS subsidy, making their effect on the structuring decision stronger than might be expected. Because the QSBS rules 105 See Form of Stock Purchase Agreement, § III (aa) (on file with author) (describing "Section 1202 Compliance"). 106 The C Corp Structure was preferred by deal planners before the § § 1202/1045 subsidies were enacted; the subsidies are probably best viewed as a factor that reinforces the decision to adopt the C Corp Structure rather than a true cause. Indeed, the subsidies may be viewed as an effect rather than as a cause: there is no logical policy reason to limit the subsidies to C Corporations, but the NVCA had a significant role in lobbying for the tax break, and limiting the benefit to C Corporations arguably serves as a good proxy for limiting the benefit to venture capital companies rather than other small businesses. On the lobbying efforts of the NVCA, see, e. The QSBS subsidy has a more substantial effect on the VC's after-tax returns. In the examples in section one, I assumed that capital gains were taxed at a 20% rate. On that assumption, the predicted value of VC's carried interest is worth, after-tax, $1.15 million for GainCorp and $1.08 million for LossLLC. The C Corp Structure generates a carried interest which, after taxes, is $70,000 greater. 109 If, however, we assume that § 1202 applies, and that capital gains are taxed at 14%, then the GainCorp carry is worth $1.24 million, versus $1.08 million for LossLLC. If we further assume that the VCs then raise another fund of, say, $20 million dollars, and they commit $200,000 of their own capital to the new fund, investing $100,000 in new QSB stock within the required time frame, then the $100,000 would qualify for rollover under § 1045, and the GainCorp carry is worth $1.34 million versus $1.08 million for LossLLC. In this case, the VCs' after-tax return on the investment in GainCorp is $260,000 greater than the after-tax return on the investment in LossLLC, an increase of nearly 20%.
In sum, because VCs are compensated with a portion of the gains of the entire fund and share in virtually none of the losses, it is entirely rational for them to focus on the tax consequences of potential gains and maximize their own after-tax returns. The effect of NOLs and the QSBS subsidy of § § 1202 and 1045 give VCs another rational reason to prefer the C Corp Structure.
IV. COMPLEXITY AND THE C CORP ADVANTAGE
It has been easier, historically, to create and run a startup organized as a corporation rather than as a partnership or LLC. Lawyers and deal planners are becoming more adept at addressing the complexities associated with passthrough entities, but some tricky issues remain. It is worth highlighting three areas which illustrate how the corporate form is simpler and easier: employee compensation, corporate governance, and exit strategy.
110 110 In Silicon Valley Startups, Professor Bankman recognized the complexity of partnerships as a reason commonly cited by deal planners for preferring the C Corp structure, but he seemed to view this as more of a perceived burden than a real one. See Bankman, supra note 3, at 1751-53. Similarly, Professor Bankman did not place much emphasis on the added complexity as it relates to corporate governance or exit strategy. For the reasons discussed below, I think that complexity is a significant friction preventing deal planners from choosing the C Corp structure.
A. Compensating Employees is Simpler
For an entrepreneur thinking about forming or joining a new business, compensation issues make the C Corp Structure more attractive than the Passthrough Structure. Partnership tax law treats any employee with an equity stake as a partner, complicating compensation issues and increasing tax liabilities for the employees. The chief obstacle relates to the tax treatment of partnership options, although a preliminary discussion of § 83 and the general tax treatment of property granted in exchange for services may be helpful in framing the relevant issues.
Section 83. Section 83 is a timing rule governing what happens when an
employee is given property in exchange for services. The baseline rule is that such property is the equivalent of cash salary and is taxable as ordinary income at that point in time at which the property is not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. One could even argue that the partnership form is superior, since the favorable treatment under § 83(b) requires an aggressively low valuation of the common stock at the time of the election, whereas the IRS has conceded that profits interests may be valued at zero under normal circumstances. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 32. On the other hand, given the IRS's practice of not challenging valuations of common stock in this context, I question whether the partnership form has any advantages. In any event, I do think that whatever minimal advantage is gained on the valuation question is more than offset by the increased complexity of partnership profits interests.
Employee/Partner Issues. The C Corp Structure is also advantageous regarding other tax consequences for employees of the startup. In the Passthrough Structure, each employee of the startup who receives an equity stake becomes a partner for tax purposes.
Partner status creates several administrative burdens. To start with the mundane, employee/partners would have to be provided with K-1 forms to help them report income at the federal and (perhaps multi-) state level, creating an administrative headache for both employees and for company bookkeepers. As a result of the K-1s, employees would gain access to financial information which top management may not want disclosed. 118 Amounts paid to employees would normally be treated as guaranteed payments to a partner under § 707(c), but might also be characterized as allocative distributions of partnership income. The Passthrough Structure also creates a risk that the IRS might recharacterize salary payments to non-partner/employees as payments to "disguised" partners, particularly if salary amounts are contingent on the performance of the company.
119 See § 1401 et seq. The self-employment tax is the equivalent of a payroll tax on corporate employees; to make matters worse, however, LLC members must pay tax of 15.3% of their total distributive share, including profits as well as guaranteed payments (i.e. salary), subject to the usual cap on social security contributions. Corporate employees, on the other hand, only pay tax on salary, not other distributions. LLC members receive a 60% deduction for health insurance premiums, while corporations receive a 100% deduction. The granting of a partnership option is relatively unproblematic, as it is accepted that the grant of the option is not a taxable event to either the entrepreneur or the partnership, unless the option has a "readily ascertainable fair market value" when granted, which will not normally be the case. 124 It is possible, however, that merely granting a partnership option makes the holder a partner for tax purposes, leading to the administrative nuisances described above.
125
There are additional complications when the employee exercises the option. If the option gives the holder the right to acquire a profits interest, it unclear what amount, if any, is taxable at exercise. 126 If the option gives the holder the right to acquire a capital interest, then it is clear that some amount should be taxable at exercise, but it is unclear how this amount should be measured. 127 Moreover, assuming some amount is taxable to the holder, then the partnership should receive a deduction, but it is unclear how the instead of being employed by the partnership directly, the partnership would create a C Corporation to act as a management company, and the founders and managers would become employees of the management company, receiving salary and benefits just like other employees. The management company would be reimbursed for salary payments on a cost-plus basis. While this solution solves some of the employee/partner problems, it is not a silver bullet; every layer of organization adds to the filing fees and legal and accounting overhead of the business, and the C Corp Structure is still easier to understand and implement. 125 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at 1181.
126 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at 1201. Under general § 83 principles, the holder should be taxed on the difference between the true fair market value and the amount of the exercise price plus any option premium paid. Under Subchapter K principles, however, a liquidation analysis would be used, normally resulting in zero value for a profits interest and a lower value for a capital interest.
127 A liquidation analysis would likely result in a low valuation if the VC Fund retains rights to get allocations first that reflect a liquidation preference.
deduction may be allocated among the various existing and incoming partners. 128 It is also unclear whether the exercise is a taxable event to the historic partners as a deemed sale of a portion of partnership assets to the incoming partner. 129 As the assets of the startup will have appreciated in value at the time of the exercise, the historic partners risk accelerating a tax bill at a time when they are unlikely to have cash with which to pay the tax. Finally, it is also worth noting that partnership options make it more difficult to maintain proper capital accounts. Finally, the complexity of drafting partnership options cannot be dismissed.
Although the theory is relatively simple for those familiar with partnership tax principles, 128 To avoid negative tax consequences to the incoming partner, some partnerships will make a special allocation of the entire partnership deduction to the incoming partner, thereby completely offsetting the incoming partner's tax liability. It is questionable whether this strategy conforms with the § 704(b) regulations.
129 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at text accompanying note 4.
130 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at 1206. 131 See Joseph E. Bachelder, Equity Participation by Executives in Main Street/Dot Com Ventures, 1213 PLI / Corp 67, 73 (2000) (stating that FASB 123 applies to options to acquire capital interests, but that treatment of options to acquire profits interests is unclear). Arguably, the same standards apply to options to acquire capital interests in a partnership or even profits interests in the partnership. But given that FASB 123 is under attack in the wake of the Enron scandal, accountants may not be as willing to be aggressive. the mechanics are difficult. In particular, the flexibility and variability of partnership agreements with regard to the allocation of income and loss and the maintenance of capital accounts makes the drafting extremely tricky. As one practitioner has explained, Drafting an option on a partnership interest is a complex task and is normally much more difficult than drafting an option on a share of common stock in the corporate context. It requires an understanding of the parties' economic deal, the partnership's allocation, distribution and capital account mechanics and the interaction of those mechanics with the purchase of a partnership interest on exercise of the option (including, e.g., the initial capital account to be given to [the service partner] on exercise of the option and the impact of writing up (or not writing up) capital accounts on option exercise).
133
This complexity not only increases legal costs, it could make it more difficult to attract talented employees. Unlike executives of public companies, startup employees often do not retain counsel, instead relying on the company to explain the employment compensation package. Employees may be suspicious of the more complicated nature of partnership options and discount the value of the proposed compensation package accordingly.
B. Corporate Governance and Drafting
Corporate law differences between a closely-held corporation and a limited liability company are generally thought to be insignificant. 134 In practice, however, there is enough uncertainty about how corporate governance provisions will be applied, and there are enough difficult drafting issues, so that even today clients are sometimes wary about using a non-corporate entity. Rev. 713 (1997) .
In recent years, however, corporate investors have used a hybrid structure called, not very creatively, the "Barnes and Noble dot com Structure." In the B&N.com structure, a corporate parent (or two) creates a special purpose subsidiary that becomes the managing member of an LLC. Another corporation is created as an IPO vehicle and becomes the other member of the LLC. Through a high-vote / low-vote structure, the corporate investor can maintain control over the startup and enjoy the passthrough of tax losses; the IPO vehicle facilitates exit strategy. The development of the hybrid structure shows that where the tax losses are truly valuable -i.e., when most of the money invested in the startup comes from a corporate taxable investor -deal planners can overcome the path dependence problem and use a different structure.
C. Smoother Exit Strategy
Corporate governance and employee compensation issues make the C Corp Structure advantageous for creating and running a startup. It is also vital to examine exit strategy, where -in most cases -it is also easier for investors to sell their stake in a venture capital startup if it has been structured as a corporation from the beginning.
144
Of course, partnerships and LLCs may legally convert into corporations, and often do. The incorporation process is not as easy as it might seem, however, particularly when a sale or reorganization is close at hand. 145 It is tempting to tell a signaling story here. In a 1997 symposium, Professor Ian Ayres raised signaling as a possible explanation for the choice of organizational structure. See Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 503, 517 (discussing importance of sociological explanations for irrational economic behavior and raising possibility that "Bankman does not adequately consider how the choice to incorporate might be a way for managers to signal to venture capitalists a higher likelihood that the firm will succeed.") [ ]. Organizing as a corporation focuses attention on gains, not losses. Exit strategy might be an especially important area to signal, as organizing as a corporation could signal that an IPO or acquisition is the preferred exit. In other words -to continue the baseball metaphor -organizing as a corporation sends a positive signal, like Babe Ruth's pointing his bat at the right field bleachers. Organizing as a partnership, on the other hand, would send a negative signal, like squaring around to lay down a bunt.
The signaling story works, however, only if the signal (the choice of organizational form) is expensive to send, so that only high quality firms can send the signal. Here, both good and bad firms send the signal, creating a pooling equilibrium rather than a separating equilibrium. See Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 83 (1994) . Thus, there may be some stigma associated with choosing the partnership form (as it shows possible disregard for the importance of keeping organizational expenses low), but the existence of the hybrid structure, supra note --, suggests that whatever negative signal is sent is easy to overcome. 145 But cf. John M. Cunningham, The Limited Liability Company: Entity of Choice for High-Tech StartUps?, 13 Computer Law. 11, 17 (1996) (recommending LLC if likely exit is asset sale, C Corp if likely exit is stock sale, arguing that IPO exit is irrelevant because incorporation process is "manageable"). creating a corporate entity that can sell shares to the public in an IPO. See generally Rev. Rul. 84-111 (recognizing different tax consequences depending on method used). The first option is to have the partnership contribute the assets to a newly formed corporation (Newco) in exchange for 100% of Newco's common stock. Newco then sells newly-issued shares of common stock to the public, thereby splitting the ownership between the partnership and the public. Sometime after the IPO the partnership would liquidate, distributing the Newco stock upstream to the VC Fund and the managers and founders of the startup. The VC Fund could then sell shares to the public in a secondary offering or distribute the shares to the LP investors.
The second option is to have the VC fund and the startup's management contribute their partnership interests to Newco in exchange for common stock. The Newco stock would be allocated between the Fund and management according to the original partnership agreement. Newco would then own 100% of the partnership. The partnership would automatically be liquidated, and Newco would then own the assets of the partnership directly. Newco would then sell shares to the public in an IPO, and the Fund, now holding marketable shares, could follow suit in a secondary offering.
The third option begins with a momentary liquidation of the business. The partnership would liquidate, distributing its assets upstream to the VC fund and the startup's management as outlined in the partnership agreement. The VC fund and management would then immediately contribute those assets to Incorporating before an IPO can also create a securities law issue for LP investors, particularly if the startup was not meticulously advised by legal counsel when it was first organized. Under Rule 144, the SEC requires selling shareholders in a private company to hold securities for at least one year prior to sale. The holding period of LLC or partnership interests normally does not tack to the corporate stock received in the exchange. This holding period rule potentially delays the exit of the VC Fund by up to one year -six months or nine months longer than underwriters normally require.
Sophisticated lawyers may be able to structure around this SEC Rule: commentators have noted that if the original LLC operating agreement provides that the entity will incorporate in connection with an IPO, that no additional consideration will be paid by investors in connection with the incorporation, and that the incorporation will cause no shift in the holders' economic interests not contemplated by the original documents, then the Rule 144 restriction should not apply.
154 So long as the entire IPO process -from the exchange of partnership interests for convertible preferred stock followed by conversion to common followed by sale to the public -was contemplated and outlined in the original documents, the SEC rule should not prove to be too high a hurdle for selling shareholders. It does, however, require some additional planning, adding yet again to the transaction costs of the Passthrough Structure.
Incorporating on the eve of an IPO can also create tax problems if the VC Fund or other shareholders plan to sell a significant stake of the business to the public in the IPO, although underwriters usually prevent such sales from happening. From a tax Newco in exchange for common stock. Newco could then sell shares to the public in an IPO, and the Fund could follow with a secondary offering.
Valuation problems probably make option one the most attractive. The VC Fund typically holds a large liquidation preference which drops away upon completion of a "qualified IPO." The liquidation preference gives the startup's founders and managers a strong incentive to build the business rapidly and successfully. Under options two and three, however, even if an IPO were in sight, the partnership would be liquidated before the completion of the qualified IPO, and the founders and managers would effectively be punished instead of rewarded. The first option -liquidating the partnership after the IPO -solves the valuation problem by leaving the liquidation preference in place until after the IPO. The partnership remains intact as the majority shareholder of Newco. One possible drawback is an information cost problem for IPO investors: IPO investors might be concerned that 75% of the shares of Newco would continue to be held by a single entity (the partnership), and presumably would want to understand how the partnership's internal governance works.
154 See Jack S. Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions § 903.4 (1998). perspective, the concern is the control requirement of § 351.
155 Se ction 351 allows shareholders to contribute property to a corporation which they control in exchange for stock without realizing any gain on the appreciation in the value of the property. 156 For an exchange to qualify as a good § 351 transaction, the contributors of the property must remain in control of the new corporation immediately after the exchange. 157 The issue is what is meant by the language "immediately after." A literal interpretation of the Code suggests that there is no problem, as the incorporation would take place at least a few days before the IPO. Under the step-transaction doctrine, however, the IRS or the courts may determine the tax consequences of a transaction completed through a series of integrated steps by looking at the steps taken together, not by evaluating each step separately. Case law in this area is generally taxpayer-favorable, indicating that absent a "binding commitment" to sell shares at the time of incorporation, then incorporation will be viewed as an independent § 351 transaction. 156 Upon incorporation, the partnership would contribute property to Newco in exchange for 100% of the common stock. The property contributed would be the assets of the business: intellectual property, equipment, goodwill, and so on. These assets are likely to have a low basis and a high fair market value, creating a high potential tax bill. If the contribution qualifies under § 351, however, no current tax will be owed, and the partnership would take a substitute basis in Newco stock equal to its basis in the contributed assets. See § 358(a) . If the contribution does not qualify under § 351, then the partnership would recognize income equal to the fair market value over the basis of the assets, and the income would be allocated between the Fund and management according to the partnership agreement. See § 1001 (sale or exchange). If the 351 transaction is not treated as a nonrecognition event, then the consequences are quite punitive. The partnership's contribution of assets to the corporation would be a taxable exchange, and the partners would have to recognize gain to the extent that the fair market value of the stock received in the exchange exceeds the partnership's (low) inside basis in the assets.
An issue arises, however, when public investors buy preexisting shares of Newco from the VC Fund in the initial public offering or in a secondary offering. Because the public investors do not contribute cash or property to Newco, it cannot be argued that they form part of the control group. If at the time of incorporation there is a binding commitment to sell between a transferor and a third party who is not part of the original control group, then the transaction will not qualify under § 351. 159 Where there is an intention to sell but no binding commitment, the law is less clear. 160 Normally, underwriters will require insiders to agree to a lockup provision, requiring them to hold on to their shares for 3 months or longer following the IPO. Given this lockup
For primary offerings of shares by the company to the public, the step transaction doctrine is not an issue, as the partnership may count the public investors as part of the 80% control group required by § 351. A Treasury regulation provides that in the case of a "qualified underwriting transaction" persons who acquire stock from an underwriter are treated as if they acquired stock directly from the company, regardless of whether the underwriting takes place on a best efforts basis (where the underwriter merely acts as an agent for the corporation) or a firm commitment basis (where the underwriter buys the stock from the company and immediately resells to the public). See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(3). This works if the investors are buying newly-issued shares, as they would be contributing property in exchange for Newco stock.
Complicating the issue somewhat is the shift of ownership which often follows soon after an IPO. The shift of significant control over non-operational matters from the insiders (the startup's founders and management and the VC fund) to the public is the a principal purpose for the incorporation and the change in organizational structure; to say that the incorporation is a truly separate transaction from the IPO and secondary offerings which follow elevates form over substance in a way that may be inconsistent with the way the step transaction doctrine is generally applied. See Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 341 (1991) (noting that binding commitment formulation seems to apply only in the case of 351 transactions and D reorgs). As explained in a leading treatise, "where the loss of control, although not pursuant to a binding obligation, is both part of a preconceived plan and a sine qua non thereof," then the step transaction doctrine should apply, Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1032 (1957 Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937) . 160 The Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that even absent a binding commitment, a plan to incorporate and then dispose of control is enough to run afoul of section 351, regardless of whether the parties were legally bound to complete the sale. Culligan Water Conditioning v. United States, 567 F.2d 867 (9 th Cir. 1978) . And in other contexts, the step transaction doctrine is applied to integrate steps of a transaction based on the "mutual interdependence" of the steps or the "end result," either of which would suggest that section 351 should not apply. requirement, most tax lawyers are comfortable giving an opinion that the step transaction doctrine will not apply. 161 Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains.
Incorporating just prior to an IPO also creates an extra opportunity for conflict between the startup's founders and managers and the VC Fund. The parties will likely want to draft new agreements outlining their rights with respect to the IPO or other potential exits, especially if these agreements were not comprehensively drafted at the outset. The VC Fund may ask for a registration rights agreement. 162 Drag-along and tagalong rights in the original partnership agreement might also have to be revised to reflect the new situation. Planning for these issues in advance can minimize costly and timeconsuming negotiations. However, since most startups are not willing to pay counsel more than a bare minimum for legal costs at the time when the startup is first organized, it is unrealistic to expect sophisticated planning to take place until much later in the life of the venture.
Incorporating on the eve of an IPO therefore raises a few issues that do not exist where the startup was organized as a corporation from the beginning. Although corporate and tax lawyers are becoming more skilled at planning for incorporation, the extra step of conversion adds some cost and complexity to the process. There is a strong argument, given the other case law, that the Ninth Circuit dicta is wrong, and that absent a binding commitment to sell to the public in a secondary offering, the step transaction doctrine should not apply. After all, a significant number of companies do poorly after an IPO, and the fund may be left holding shares that it cannot sell. Similarly, management may want to dispose of shares after the IPO lockup expires, but its ability to do so absent a binding commitment is subject to the whims of the marketplace. See O 'Connor v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. 213 (1957) .
Tax-free
162 It would be difficult although presumably not impossible to have drafted a registration rights agreement in advance concerning the registration of securities that do not yet exist.
163 See § 368. 351 is a significant barrier (and not just an aggravation) when a trade buyer seeks to acquire a partnership in a tax-free reorganization under § 368. Unlike in the IPO context, where case law and IRS rulings are generous to the taxpayer, in the reorganization context common law tax doctrines preclude a tax-free incorporation immediately before the merger.
164
It may be possible for certain trade buyers to acquire a partnership in a tax-free transaction. For example, in a § 351 acquisition structure, the buyer's shareholders would contribute all of their stock in the buyer to Newco in exchange for Newco common stock, and the sellers would contribute their partnership interests to Newco in exchange for Newco common stock. Although tax-free, the structure has a notable weakness: larger trade buyers whose stock is publicly traded are not likely to want to undergo a major change in capital structure in order to acquire a small startup. One cannot imagine Cisco, for example, asking all its shareholders to exchange their stock every time a new startup is acquired. Thus, the structure really only makes sense for a merger of equals, which, while not unusual, is not usually the most profitable exit strategy.
165
Taxable Sale to a Trade Buyer. For taxable deals, the Passthrough Structure is somewhat more complex than the C Corp Structure but might actually be advantageous.
Using the Passthrough Structure ensures the advantage of incurring only one level of tax.
If the partners exit by selling their partnership interests to the buyer for cash, they will 164 See Jack S. Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions § 302.10 (1998) . To take advantage of the traditional tax-free reorganization provisions of § 368, the partnership would first have to incorporate prior to the acquisition, raising a step transaction issue under § 351. In Revenue Ruling 70-140, a taxpayer transferred assets to a wholly owned corporation in a putative § 351 transaction, followed by a transfer of the newly issued stock of the corporation to a buyer in a B reorganization. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer did not satisfy the control requirement of § 351. Because the § 351 and the B reorganization occurred as part of a prearranged plan, the use of the corporate form was transitory and without substance, the transfer did not qualify under § 351, and the taxpayer had to pay tax on the incorporation as if it were a taxable sale of the assets. The taxpayer fared better in Weikel v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. M. 432 (1986) , where the Tax Court held that absent a binding commitment, and so long as there are valid non-tax business reasons for incorporating the business (i.e. other than to take advantage of the tax-free reorganization provisions), the step transaction doctrine would not apply. 165 In the Bigco / small LLC merger scenario, it may be possible to use the 351 structure by giving the sellers shares of Newco but exchangeable into shares of the parent (Bigco). The validity of the structure would depend on whether such a strategy amount to a "plan" for purposes of the step-transaction doctrine. So if a startup were acquired by Cisco, the startups' owners would receive shares of Newco. The shares of Newco would be illiquid, but they would be exchangeable into shares of Cisco at the option of the shareholder.
pay tax on the amount realized less basis, just as with any other asset. But the amount realized must be adjusted to account for the many aggregate-based rules of subchapter K, such as increasing the amount realized to include the discharge of the partner's share of partnership liabilities. 166 Complicating things further is § 751(a), which requires that selling partners recognize ordinary income on the sale of a partnership interest to the extent that the partnership has unrealized accounts receivable or inventory items.
167
Alternatively, the partnership could sell its assets to the acquiror, with the partnership then distributing cash upstream to the various partners. Again, the liquidating distribution would trigger recapture provisions and other partnership tax rules. Unlike the sale of stock, which is usually a relatively simple affair with well-settled tax consequences, the sale of a partnership interest requires closer (and more costly) attention from the deal lawyers.
168
But an asset sale from a partnership has the distinct advantage of giving the buyer a step up in basis in the target's assets without incurring an extra layer of tax. In order to get a step up in basis using the C Corp Structure, the startup must sell its assets to the buyer. The startup then recognizes income on the sale of the assets. Although the startup's NOL will help offset this tax liability, any additional appreciation will be taxed at the corporate rate of 35%. To get the cash to the shareholders, the startup must then undergo a liquidating distribution, which is taxable to shareholders under § 331. In contrast, if the Passthrough Structure is used, the asset sale will trigger one level of tax.
Each partner recognizes its pro rata share of the partnership's income from the sale, but the liquidating distribution by a partnership is not taxable to the partners.
In sum, organizing a startup as a partnership or LLC is a great challenge for a smart lawyer but unappealing for clients who hope to minimize legal costs. With careful planning, the Passthrough Structure achieves many of the same goals regarding creating, running, and exiting a startup company, and it is advantageous if the preferred exit is a taxable asset sale to a trade buyer. 
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the seemingly irrational decision to organize a startup as a corporation is, in fact, quite rational. The key factors are the limited ability of investors to use tax losses, agency costs, the tax treatment of gains, and the complexity of the Passthrough Structure. This Article has also demonstrated the value of avoiding the behavioral phenomena of optimism bias as a simple explanation for seemingly irrational behavior -at least in the context of sophisticated investors with a great deal of money at stake. Optimism plays a role, to be sure, but it is not the wild-eyed optimism of a naïve entrepreneur. Rather, the VCs' rational emphasis on the tax treatment of gains, not losses, and the various tax and nontax advantages of the corporate form make the corporation the preferred vehicle for financing a venture capital startup. And so tax plumbing ends up providing a workable, if inelegant, solution to this wonderful puzzle.
